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Insider Trading Restrictions and Earnings Management 
 
 
We study whether firms that voluntarily restrict insider trading have lower incentives for 
earnings management. Using a large sample of US firms, we measure these restrictions based on 
the extent to which insider transactions happen shortly after quarterly earnings announcements. 
We find that the adoption of insider trading restrictions is associated with a reduction of 9.92 
percent in absolute discretionary accruals. Our findings are robust to controlling for changes in 
corporate governance, and we do not find evidence of a substitution effect between accruals and 
real earnings management, target beating or timeliness of loss recognition. Taken together, our 
results indicate that the voluntary adoption of blackout periods that limit insider trading improves 
the quality of financial reporting. 
 
Keywords: insider trading; voluntary insider trading restrictions; earnings management; real 
earnings management; corporate governance. 




We study whether the adoption of firm-level insider trading restrictions influences earnings 
management. From an economic point of view, insiders’ decisions to trade their firms’ shares 
depend on the trade-off between trading profits and litigation risk costs. In the absence of trading 
restrictions, it is expected that earnings management facilitates opportunistic insider trading. In 
line with this view, regulators have expressed their concerns that insider trading opportunities 
create incentives for corporate insiders to garble the earnings signal (e.g., SEC, 1998). 
In reaction to these regulatory concerns, in recent years many firms have implemented 
restrictions on the timing of insider trades beyond mandatory regulation to avoid illegal insider 
trading, or accusations thereof, in relation to upcoming earnings announcements. These 
restrictions consist of self-imposed blackout periods that allow insiders to trade in a company’s 
shares only during a limited window following an earnings announcement,1 usually 
corresponding to the first third of the quarter immediately after the announcement (Bettis, Coles, 
& Lemmon, 2000). These restrictions are adopted on a voluntary basis by boards of directors.  
Despite their popularity, there is limited research on the consequences of these self-imposed 
insider trading restrictions (ITRs), and no evidence on whether they affect the quality of financial 
reporting. The voluntary adoption of ITRs by US firms provides a unique setting to study this 
issue. Indeed, in response to the international debate on the costs and benefits of insider trading, 
whether to restrict it and how, many countries have opted to regulate it (e.g., Zhang & Zhang, 
2018). Meanwhile, in the US, regulations such as the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988, the Stock Enforcement Remedies & Penny Stock Reform of 1990, and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increased scrutiny over insider trading, but did not forbid it.  
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we use the terms “insider trading restrictions” and “blackout periods” interchangeably. 
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Against this backdrop, an increasing number of firms have opted to voluntarily design and 
adopt their own ITR policies (Bettis et al., 2000; Roulstone, 2003). This growth in voluntary 
ITRs may be because the aforementioned regulatory efforts also protected insiders’ preplanned, 
non-information-based trades from litigation, thereby providing legal cover for strategic trading 
and, in fact, incentivized it (Henderson, Jagolinzer, & Muller, 2015; Jagolinzer, 2009).2 This sets 
the question of what the consequences are of such voluntary policies. 
In this paper, we examine whether self-imposed blackout periods influence earnings 
management. To develop our predictions we build on prior work that suggests that, in the 
absence of ITRs, earnings management is positively associated with insider trading because it 
facilitates it, leading to greater profitability. For example, based on a set of firms charged with 
GAAP violations, Beneish (1999) finds that managers report overstated earnings to extend the 
period until the price drops, which allows them to sell their equity holdings at higher prices. 
Beneish & Vargus (2002) argue that managers can use income-increasing accruals to inflate 
share prices. This increases insider trading profitability by avoiding losses and extending the gap 
between their sales of shares and the release of negative private information, and reduces the 
litigation risk associated with SEC scrutiny.  
Following the logic of this prior work, we expect that firms’ efforts to restrict insider trading 
will lead to a reduction in earnings management. However, the nature of the imposed restrictions 
could plausibly have the opposite effect. Restricting the timing of trades to a window after the 
                                                 
2 Anecdotal evidence also supports the view that mandatory regulation focused on the disclosure of the trades 
potentially provides legal cover, therefore failing at curbing insider trading. For example, in February 2019, the 
senior director of corporate law of Apple, lawyer Gene Levoff, was charged by the SEC with insider trading. He was 
in charge of restricting employees’ insider trading. (See, e.g., https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/sec-files-insider-
trading-lawsuit-against-former-apple-lawyer.html)  
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earnings announcement could incentivize managers to obfuscate the information in the 
announcement, to retain their ability to trade profitably.  
To examine whether these restrictions curb earnings management, we identify US firms that 
voluntarily adopted ITRs from 1996 to 2012, following the methods of Roulstone (2003) and 
Lee, Lemmon, Li, & Sequeira (2014). We classify firms as adopters of ITRs based on their 
insider trading patterns. In a restricted firm, insiders would be likely to trade their firm’s shares 
during the allowed window, as opposed to during the restricted period. Specifically, we first 
calculate the percentage of insider trades that happen in the first third of a quarter (i.e., during the 
first 20 trading days between two consecutive quarterly earnings announcements). We refer to 
this percentage as PercentageSafe. Then, similar to Lee et al. (2014), we identify firms that 
voluntarily adopt ITRs by isolating the first quarter when: (1) at least 75 percent of the insider 
transactions fall within the allowed trading window (i.e., during the first third of the quarter); and 
(2) this percentage remains above 50 percent thereafter. We validate our method and measure by 
manually checking the insider trading policies for a random subsample of firms.  
We match our ITR adopters to non-adopters (control firms) to understand the consequences 
of insider trading restrictions. To ensure that ITR adopters and control firms are similar in their 
ex-ante probability of adopting ITRs, we use propensity score matching (PSM). We study the 
quarterly levels of earnings management before and after adopting these blackout periods using a 
difference-in-differences approach. We measure earnings management using the modified Jones 
discretionary accruals model, as adjusted by Collins, Pungaliya, & Vijh (2017).  
After controlling for firm characteristics associated with earnings management, we 
document that adopting ITRs is associated with less earnings management. We show a predicted 
reduction of 9.92 percent in absolute discretionary accruals and of 9.48 percent in income-
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increasing accruals after a firm adopts blackout periods, ceteris paribus. To check whether these 
results are sensitive to our choice of ITRs proxy, we repeat our analysis using a more stringent 
measure of voluntary ITRs. To construct this alternative measure, we consider that a firm 
restricts insider trading when 75 percent of trades in each quarter following the adoption date 
happen during the allowed window. We find similar results. Additionally, to rule out the 
possibility that our measure might capture preplanned trades by insiders due to the adoption of 
rule 10b5-1 in 2000, we restrict our sample to the pre-2000 period. Our results also hold.  
Next, we conduct additional tests to better depict the consequences of ITRs. First, we study 
real earnings management (REM). Enhanced monitoring over one type of earnings management 
may create incentives to manage earnings in other ways (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Zang, 2012; 
Chan, Chen, Chen, & Yu, 2015). We replicate our main tests using REM measures, based on 
Roychowdhury (2006), and find no evidence of substitution, while total earnings management 
decreases post-ITRs. Thus, our results suggest that, by limiting trading to certain time windows, 
voluntary ITRs dampen the incentives for earnings management. This makes intuitive sense: if 
the opportunity to trade on low quality earnings is limited, the overall practice of lowering 
earnings quality using any instrument (accounting or real) should be reduced. 
Following Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, & McInnis (2009), we also study the probability of firms 
meeting earnings targets. We find a reduced likelihood of meeting or beating earnings forecast 
by opportunistically reducing research and development expenditures after ITRs adoption. This 
is consistent with the previously discussed evidence. We next examine the timeliness of loss 
recognition following the adoption of ITRs. If managers have to wait to trade until after the 
earnings announcement, they might choose to delay bad news to maintain stock prices. We find 
5 
no support for this scenario. Finally, we provide evidence of a lower probability of earnings 
restatements in firms that voluntarily adopt ITRs. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we add to the earnings 
management research by identifying a novel mechanism to reduce it: via voluntarily adopted 
ITRs. This answers the call in Beneish & Vargus (2002) for research to investigate the extent to 
which insider trading opportunities influence earnings management. Our evidence is relevant to 
regulators such as the SEC, given enduring concerns that insider trading may lead to a 
deterioration of the firm information environment. Our study also relates to recent work on the 
effects of the voluntary adoption of corporate policies on financial reporting quality, such as 
claw-back provisions (Chan, Chen, Chen, & Yu, 2012; Chan et al., 2015). The study of voluntary 
ITRs allows us to observe changes in reporting quality following a change in the way in which 
insiders are allowed to make use of private information. Evidence on the consequences of 
voluntary firm-level decisions is important, as it informs regulators of the need to mandate rules 
that may eliminate the benefits of signaling through costly voluntary actions. Also, exploiting 
voluntary ITR adoption in a single country (the US) removes other country-level heterogeneities.  
Second, we contribute to the strand of literature that analyzes why firms impose ITRs. 
Despite the apparently large number of firms imposing blackouts, research on the consequences 
of these policies remains inconclusive. Some argue that restrictions on insider trading impose 
costs on insiders (Manne, 1966), have cost of capital benefits (Fishman & Hagerty, 1992), and 
that restricting trading via lockups before seasoned equity offerings reduces agency problems 
(Karpoff, Lee, & Masulis, 2013). On the other side of the debate, others find that insider trading 
in the restricted period continues and is profitable, unless approval to trade by the firm’s general 
counsel is also required (Jagolinzer, Larcker, & Taylor, 2011; Lee et al., 2014). For firms to 
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impose ITRs, the benefits must outweigh the costs. Our results identify one potential benefit 
stemming from ITR adoption and support the notion that these self-imposed restrictions can 
reduce earnings management. This is of interest, especially in light of prior findings that cast 
doubts over ITRs effectiveness in curbing trading or reducing its profitability.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We begin by reviewing the literature. 
Next, we describe the data and research methods. We then present the main results, followed by 
the additional analyses and conclusion. 
 
Related research and hypothesis 
To convey managerial information about firm performance, GAAP allows managers, who fall 
under the SEC definition of firm insiders, a certain level of judgment over financial reporting.3 
Executives can choose the reporting measures, estimates, and disclosures that best depict the 
firm’s underlying economics. However, this discretion leaves room for opportunistic earnings 
management and for managers to alter financial reports, reducing the quality of public financial 
information (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Extant work consistently shows that insiders make risk-
adjusted abnormal returns from trading in the securities of their firms (e.g., Jagolinzer et al., 
2011; Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Seyhun, 1986), suggesting that they can beat the market by 
using private information, and carefully timing their trades. For example, Huddart, Ke, & Shi 
(2007) find that when insiders avoid trading in the period before the earnings announcement, 
they trade afterward and profit on the information yet to be released in the 10-Q or 10-K.  
Prior research establishes the association between managerial incentives and firm-level 
earnings management. Cheng & Warfield (2005) find that managers with high equity incentives 
                                                 
3
 Corporate insiders are defined by the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act as corporate officers, directors, and owners 
of 10 percent or more of any equity class of securities. 
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manage earnings to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts, to increase the value of the shares to be 
sold. Teoh, Welch, & Wong (1998) show that issuers with unusually high accruals in the IPO 
year experience poor stock returns in the following three years, suggesting that earnings 
management is used for window-dressing purposes before public offerings. This literature 
contextualizes the agency problem faced by insiders. On the one hand, insiders are responsible 
for making decisions that maximize firm value and for designing disclosure policies that increase 
the information available to outside investors. On the other hand, private information creates 
incentives to obtain profits via insider trading, and these profits increase with the extent of 
information advantage. 
Several studies show that higher informativeness of insider trading is associated with lower 
financial reporting quality. Explaining this finding, prior work considers firms’ disclosures as 
exogenous and suggests that insiders take advantage of the low quality of these disclosures, as 
well as of their private information, to trade opportunistically (Aboody, Hughes, & Liu, 2005; 
Maffett, 2012; Gu & Li, 2012). However, some insiders, such as managers, can directly affect 
the accounting practices of their firms, while other insiders, such as directors or large 
shareholders, can influence these practices indirectly, by opting not to monitor managers and 
instead profit from stock tips (Bhattacharya & Daouk, 2002). Consistent with this view, Beneish 
& Vargus (2002), Cheng & Lo (2006) and Rogers (2008) argue that insiders can influence firm 
disclosure and trade profitably on their subsequent information advantage. Indeed, insider 
trading yields higher returns in firms with more information asymmetries and lower reporting 
quality (Aboody et al., 2005; Frankel & Li, 2004; Huddart & Ke, 2007). Consistent with this 
view, Park & Park (2004) find that insider trading is associated with prior period discretionary 
accruals. Richardson, Teoh, & Wysocki (2004) similarly find that insider selling incentivizes 
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managers to guide analysts to decrease optimistic earnings forecasts to beatable targets and 
maintain a high share valuation after the earnings announcement, and McVay, Nagar, & Tang 
(2006) find an association between earnings management to meet analysts’ forecasts and next-
quarter sales of managerial stock. Findings by Core, Guay, Richardson, & Verdi (2006) 
corroborate the link between accruals and insider trading, as they document a greater abnormal 
volume of insider purchases when firms report lower accruals.  
Hypothesis development 
Despite the evidence that insider trading affects the information environment of firms, there is 
little research focusing on the efforts of firms to restrict it. Notable exceptions are Bettis et al. 
(2000), Roulstone (2003), Jagolinzer et al. (2011), and Lee et al. (2014). Also closely related is 
the work of Zhang & Zhang (2018), that exploits variation in international insider trading 
regulation and finds a decrease in earnings smoothness after country-wide enforcements of 
insider trading laws. In the US, Beneish (1999) finds that the SEC rarely imposes trading 
sanctions on insiders who were charged with inflating earnings and also selling stock. Research 
analyzing the effectiveness of insider trading laws in international settings finds that insider 
trading enforcement in fact increases the incidence and profitability of insider trading (Bris, 
2005).  
It is not obvious how this mixed evidence on the effect of mandatory insider trading 
regulation translates to single-country voluntary adoption settings, where firms are classified as 
ITR adopters based on actual observed patterns of insider trading. Consider the case of insider 
sales (a similar logic would apply to purchases). Before the adoption of ITRs, an insider privy to 
future bad earnings news would prefer to sell shares prior to the upcoming earnings 
announcement (EAt), when the share price would likely drop. However, managers face high 
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scrutiny around news events (Seyhun, 1992), and doing so may trigger suspicion on the part of 
the SEC. Beneish & Vargus (2002) argue that SEC scrutiny in insider sales decreases with the 
time gap between the trade and the subsequent drop in share price. In this context, the insider 
may manage accruals to increase the earnings reported at EAt to delay the decrease in stock 
price, and deflect regulatory attention. We therefore expect that it is likely that, when there are 
no ITRs in place, insiders have incentives to engage in earnings management.  
After the adoption of ITRs, the insider must wait to trade until after the earnings 
announcement (EAt). If the insider manages earnings before the sale, the profits on the trade 
would be higher, but this increases the risk of litigation as the release of bad earnings news are 
delayed to the following quarterly earnings announcement, EAt+1. This is a reasonable 
assumption as discretionary accruals often reverse in the following quarter (Baber, Kang, & Li, 
2011). Alternatively, if ITRs deter insiders from managing earnings prior to the sale, profits from 
trading would be lower, but so would the litigation risk. Given that litigation risk is costly to 
insiders, we expect that the latter scenario is more likely to happen. Ultimately, the choice made 
by insiders when faced with a trade-off between insider trading profits and litigation risk is an 
empirical question of interest. Formally stated, we test the following hypothesis: 
H1:  Voluntary adoption of ITRs reduces earnings management. 
 
Data and measurement choice  
Sample selection 
For our analyses, we require the dates of both insider trades and quarterly earnings 
announcements. Insider trading data comes from Thomson Financial Insider Filings. We retain 
only open market purchases and sales. Quarterly earnings announcement dates and accounting 
information comes from Compustat Quarterly. We require complete accounting information to 
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calculate discretionary accruals as described below.4 This generates a sample of 11,215 firms and 
334,457 quarterly observations from 1996-2012. We remove financial firms, as their accrual-
generating process cannot be compared to that of other firms. We compute corporate governance 
measures based on I/B/E/S and ISS (formerly RiskMetrics) data.  
We begin by computing PercentageSafe as the ratio of trades performed by managers during 
the safe-to-trade period to the total volume of trades over the entire quarter. We define an ITR 
adopter as a firm that has a significant increase in PercentageSafe and maintains a high level 
over the following quarters. We eliminate firms where PercentageSafe does not fall below 50 
percent in any quarter during the sample-period, as these firms are likely to have put ITRs in 
place prior to our sample-period. Our methodology allows us to identify firms that adopt 
blackout periods and those that do not have such restrictions in place, and also to determine the 
quarter when a firm adopts blackout windows. We outline these details in the following section. 
To ensure that our criteria for identifying whether a firm is an adopter or not is met, we require 
that adopting firms have insider trading data for at least three quarters before and after the ITR 
adoption and that non-adopters also have data for at least seven quarters.  
Because our main analysis consists of a difference-in-differences approach on a PSM 
sample, we require that firms have data for the ITR determinants outlined below. For adopting 
firms this includes having non-missing data in the quarter of ITR adoption, as this is the quarter 
used for matching. Finally, adopting firms need to have at least one observation before and one 
after the adoption quarter available after eliminating quarters with missing ITR determinants. 
Next, we use propensity score matching to match each ITR-adopting firm to a control firm. After 
                                                 
4 We retain observations for firms that have incomplete time series data in these databases by replacing missing 
values by 0 and including a binary indicator that takes 1 when the variable is missing and 0 otherwise. 
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matching, the final sample consists of 566 ITR-adopting firms and 566 control firms over the 
period 1996–2012. The sample generation process is summarized in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
Insider trading restrictions proxy 
Insider trading restrictions are firm-level voluntarily adopted policies, whereby firms self-
regulate who can trade the company stock, when and under which circumstances, often under the 
general adage of ‘when in doubt, do not trade.’ As an illustrative example, below we provide an 
excerpt from Shake Shack’s insider trading policy:5  
No officer, director or employee shall purchase or sell any type of security while in 
possession of material, non-public information relating to the security, whether the issuer 
of such security is the Company or any other company. Additionally, no officer, director 
or employee listed on Schedule I shall purchase or sell any security of the Company 
during the period beginning on the 14th calendar day before the end of any fiscal quarter 
of the Company and ending upon the completion of the first full trading day after the 
public release of earnings data for such fiscal quarter or during any other trading 
suspension period declared by the Company. For the purposes of this Policy, a “trading 
day” is a day on which national stock exchanges are open for trading.” (Shake Shack 
INC., Insider Trading Compliance Policy) 
Consistent with this anecdotal evidence, Bettis et al. (2000) find that the most common 
restriction is to allow insiders to trade only during a period closely following earnings 
announcements. However, the exact date when blackouts are imposed is an internal decision, 
often unobservable (the case quoted above exemplifies this fact). This justifies the use of an ITRs 
proxy based on actual insider trading. We follow Roulstone (2003) in considering the allowed 
trading window as the first third (approximately one calendar month or 20 trading days) of the 
period between two consecutive quarterly earnings announcements. Figure 1 depicts the nature 
of the allowed versus restricted trading periods in two quarters. Furthermore, we compute 
                                                 
5
 Original document available at: https://s2.q4cdn.com/686132520/files/doc_downloads/policies/Insider-Trading-
Compliance-Policy-(Shake-Shack-Inc)-Final-Approved-1-15-15.pdf  
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PercentageSafe as the ratio of the number of trades by insiders during the allowed trading 
window to the total number of trades by insiders during the quarter. Because not all insiders have 
decision-making power over financial reporting, we only consider trades performed by insiders 
in management functions, defined as CEOs, CFOs, chairmen of the board, officers, presidents 
and vice-presidents (Lee et al., 2014). Also following Lee et al. (2014), we remove quarters with 
less than three trades, given that in such cases PercentageSafe would not be meaningful.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To identify firms that adopt ITRs, we proceed as follows. First, we identify the first quarter 
for which PercentageSafe is greater than or equal to 75 percent. This cut-off is consistent with 
Roulstone (2003) and Lee et al. (2014) and based on findings in Bettis et al. (2000) that insiders 
in firms with these types of ITRs are three times more likely to trade in the allowed window than 
in the restricted window. Similarly, Jagolinzer et al. (2011) show that approximately 24 percent 
of the trades in their sample take place during the restricted period; they suggest that this might 
partially be a consequence of Rule 10b5-1, enacted in 2000, which allows insiders to pre-plan 
their trades. Second, we require that the subsequent mean PercentageSafe is greater than or equal 
to 50 percent.6 That is because once the ITR is in place, it is unlikely to be removed (Lee et al 
2014). For these firms, the EventDate (ITR adoption) is the first quarter in which both of these 
conditions are met (Lee et al., 2014).7 Non-adopters are then firms that do not experience an 
                                                 
6 As the allowed trading window varies with the trading policies of individual firms, we adopt 50 percent as our 
cutoff for having insider trading periods in place to capture that there may be firms that have longer allowed trading 
windows yet enforce the restrictions. This allocates 4,682 of the firms in the sample as firms that adopt between 
1996 and 2012, representing 190,552 firm-year observations, and 5,855 firms as non-adopters representing 134,579 
firm-year observations. Our inferences hold when we use a stricter benchmark of 75 percent as reported in Table 9.  
7 We start with the full universe of insider trading and financial data, which begins in 1986. This allows us to 
classify as adopters those firms that adopt ITRs during the sample period (i.e., after 1996, when RiskMetrics data 
becomes available) and to exclude from the analysis early adopters (that adopt before 1996). 
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increase in PercentageSafe above 75 percent followed by a quarterly average above the 50 
percent threshold.8  
To validate our identification strategy, we hand-collect data on insider trading policies of a 
subsample of randomly selected firms included in the S&P 500 (236 in total). Consistent with 
Jagolinzer et al. (2011), we find that ITPs are not generally available. They state that “although 
there seems to be little proprietary information in the ITP and many companies have corporate 
governance material on their Web sites, ITPs are generally not publicly available for most 
firms” (p. 1253). By searching firm’s corporate websites, when available, we identify corporate 
governance documents that outline their policies and collect data on the nature of the restrictions. 
We compare the current disclosed policy to the most recently observed insider trading and find 
that almost 70 percent of the adopters we identify using our method also have documents 
outlining blackout periods. Only rarely do firms state that they have blackouts whilst insider 
trading still occurs in the restricted time window (14 firms). These firms are, however, correctly 
classified in our analyses, as our empirical strategy identifies ITR adopters as firms where 
insiders do not trade during the restricted windows. This manual analysis provides some 
assurance that our classification is adequate, and justifies our approach of using actual trading 
behavior, given the partial and incomplete disclosure policies observed. A further benefit of our 
approach is that while ITRs may be adopted by more firms (Bettis et al. (2000) report that 78 
percent of firms in their sample have explicit blackout periods), not all firms appear to monitor 
their application, leading to insider trading in the blackout periods. In additional analyses, we 
report a robustness test using a more restrictive definition of ITR adopters.  
                                                 
8 Based on our calculations the proportion of adopters increases from 35.6 percent in 1996 to 61.8 percent in 2012. 
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Accruals-based earnings management proxy 
To avoid bias in our measure, we compute discretionary accruals using the entire universe of 
firms in Compustat Quarterly. We estimate the following model in cross-section for industry-













+β5SGi,q-4+εi,q,             (1) 
where TA is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus operating 
cash flow.9 ΔSales is the change in sales, ΔRec is the change in accounts receivable, and PPE is 
gross property, plant, and equipment. Following Collins et al. (2017), we include as additional 
regressors return on assets in the same quarter of the previous year, ROAi,q-4, and the growth in 
sales in the same quarter of the previous year, SGi,q-4. All variables, including the intercept, are 
scaled by total assets at the end of the previous quarter. We also include an unscaled intercept. 
The absolute values of the estimated residuals from Equation (1) are our discretionary accruals 
measure (AbsDA_MJ). All variables are defined in Appendix 1.   
 
Research design  
Propensity score matching 
We use propensity score matching to identify pairs of adopters and control firms. This approach 
is more robust to the misspecification of the functional form of the underlying relation between 
earnings management and the effective date of the ITRs than the typical regression approach. It 
                                                 
9
 We undo the year-to-date values in the statement of cash flows to arrive at the quarterly figure. 
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allows us to alleviate concerns regarding the endogeneity induced by a preference of firms with a 
particular set of characteristics for adopting blackouts.  
In particular, we estimate the probability that a firm will impose blackouts as a function of a 
set of corporate governance and information asymmetry variables as follows.  
PROB(Adopter = 1) = 1/(1+eßX), where: 
βX=α0 + α0Size + α1BTM + α2ROA + α3Lev + α4InstOwner + α5InstOwner_d+ α6BdIndep  
+ α7BdIndep_d + α8InvEIndex + α9EIndex_d + α10TotalComp + α11Tenure  
+ α12Execucomp_d + α13ZScore + α14NrAnalyst + α15Analyst_d + α16Growth           (2) 
Equation (2) represents the probit model used. We base our choice of determinants of voluntary 
adopting ITRs on the literature that finds that restricted firms are larger, have lower book-to-
market (BTM) ratios, are followed by more analysts, and have greater institutional ownership 
than nonrestricted ones (Roulstone, 2003; Lee et al., 2014). We also include return on assets, 
board independence, entrenchment index, total compensation, tenure, Z-score, leverage, and 
sales growth to ensure the control sample is similar across all observable dimensions and, 
importantly, across corporate governance dimensions (see Appendix 1 for the variables 
definitions). For every event-quarter in the ITR adoption group, we select the closest control firm 
using the nearest-neighbor matching procedure, with replacement. Each firm in the control group 
receives a pseudo-event date in the same quarter as its corresponding ITR-adopting firm. Our 
final sample consists of 566 matched pairs. To retain the maximum number of observations, we 
include all observations that fall within the earliest and latest quarter of available data for each 
matched pair in all samples, even if data for an interim quarter is missing for one of the firms in a 
16 
pair. This results in a sample of 19,183 firm-quarter observations for firms that adopt during our 
sample period and 17,337 for the closest match non-adopters. 10 
Regression analysis on the matched sample 
We study whether voluntarily adopted ITRs affect earnings management. As a first test, we 
examine the relation between earnings management and our measure of ITR adoption.  
AMi,q= α+β1 Postq + β2 Adopteri + β3 Post x Adopteri,q + β4 Controlsi,q + νu + tq + εi,q,        (3) 
where AMit is our earnings management proxy, as described. Postq takes the value 0 (1) before 
(after) the event or pseudo-event, and is missing in the quarter of the event or pseudo-event; 
Adopteri  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm adopts ITR at one point during the sample 
period, and 0 for control firms; and Post x Adopteri,q takes the value 1 after a firm has adopted 
ITRs, and 0 otherwise. νu and tq are industry and quarter fixed effects, respectively. Controls is a 
vector of control variables that have been shown by the literature to influence the level of 
earnings management which suggests that larger firms, and firms with better corporate 
governance and better internal control mechanisms, are less likely to manage earnings (Warfield, 
Wild, & Wild, 1995; Klein, 2002). More profitable and more stable firms (with lower growth 
opportunities) are also less likely to manage earnings (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; Collins 
et al., 2017), as are firms with higher institutional ownership (Zang, 2012). Therefore, we control 
for firm size (Size), book-to-market (BTM), and firm profitability (ROA). Following Chan et al. 
(2015), we also control for the firm information environment (NrAnalyst), board independence 
                                                 
10 If we run the PSM without replacement, our sample decreases to 452 pairs, corresponding to 19,794 observations. 
The main inferences are retained for this reduced sample. 
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(BoardIndep), the level of managerial entrenchment (InvEIndex),11 and the extent of balance 
sheet bloat (NOA), given that the use of accruals-based earnings management is constrained by 
the extent to which the firm has previously engaged in such practices (Barton & Simko 2002). 
Finally, we also control for Altman’s Z-score (ZScore), auditor size (BIG4), and leverage (Lev). 
We use absolute discretionary accruals to measure earnings management. A concern with 
using unsigned abnormal accruals is a potential over-rejection of the null hypothesis. Prior work 
shows that several firm-specific characteristics relate to the error variance in discretionary 
accruals estimation models, though this does not necessarily contribute to earnings management 
(Hribar & Nichols 2007). To mitigate this potential bias, we follow Hribar & Nichols’ (2007) 
recommendation in controlling for operating volatility by including the standard deviation of 
cash flows (Sigma_CFO) and the standard deviation of revenues (Sigma_REV). In Equation (3), 
the main coefficient of interest is β3. A negative and significant coefficient for Post x Adopter 
would indicate a decrease in the level of earnings management after the voluntary adoption of 




Figure 2 depicts the change in discretionary accruals (AbsDA_MJ) before and after voluntary 
adoption. Panel A provides preliminary evidence that voluntary ITRs are associated with lower 
earnings management and suggests that voluntary ITR adoption has lasting consequences. Panel 
B depicts absolute discretionary accruals by quartiles of the dollar-volume of insider trading in a 
                                                 
11In the case of board independence, institutional ownership, analyst following, and EIndex, to retain the maximum 
number of observations, we replace missing values for these variables by zero and include in the model an indicator 
variable that takes the value 1 when this is the case; and 0 otherwise. 
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quarter. As can be seen, in all insider trading quartiles, the extent of earnings management 
decreases following the adoption of ITRs. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2, panel A presents the results of the probit model on which we base our propensity 
score matched control sample (Equation 2). Panel B reports the mean of all observable 
characteristics in the year of the adoption of the restriction for the ITR-adopting firm and its 
matched control firm. Column 3 reports the p-values of the t-test for difference in means. There 
are no significant differences in observable characteristics in the adopters and non-adopters in 
the year of adoption. This suggests that PSM successfully identifies control firms that are similar 
to our ITR-adopting firms across these observable determinants of voluntarily adopting ITRs. 
Panel C presents descriptive statistics of adopters and non-adopters throughout the sample 
period. This is the sample that we use for the main analyses we subsequently report. Panel D 
shows that most adopters operate in the health and consumer industries. In panel E, we present 
descriptive statistics of the consequences of ITR adoption. There are no significant changes in 
the book-to-market and return on assets for these firms, although, after adoption, Tobin’s Q 
seems to decrease and the Z-score to increase. Overall, this supports the idea that adopting firms 
are not worse off after adoption. In line with Roulstone (2003), total compensation seems to be 
higher after adoption, implying that managers require a pay premium for these restrictions. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]  
Regression analysis 
Our main test of H1 is equation (3), which we use to study the levels of accruals-based earnings 
management before and after trading restrictions take effect. The main coefficient of interest is 
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β3. A negative (positive) coefficient would indicate lower (greater) earnings management after a 
blackout takes effect within a firm, as compared to control firms. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]  
Table 3 presents the results from regressing our measures of earnings management on ITR 
adoption in the PSM sample. We show results for our main absolute discretionary accruals 
measure (AbsDA_MJ) in column 1, and for the subsamples with positive and negative accruals in 
columns 2 and 3, respectively. We find that ITR adoption has a negative effect on the extent of 
AbsDA_MJ, as Post x Adopter has a negative and significant coefficient at the 1 percent and 5 
percent levels in all three columns.12,13 This translates to a predicted reduction of 9.92 percent in 
absolute discretionary accruals (column 1), and a 9.48 (10.51) percent reduction in income-
increasing (decreasing) accruals (columns 2 and 3) when a firm adopts blackout periods, ceteris 
paribus.  
Endogeneity concerns    
Insider trading restrictions are endogenous since firms voluntarily adopt them. We take several 
steps to address endogeneity concerns. First, we use propensity score matching to control for 
observable characteristics related with the likelihood of adoption. Second, because unobservable 
characteristics may influence the decision to adopt, we re-estimate our main specification using 
firm fixed effects, instead of industry fixed effects. This should mitigate the effect of any 
                                                 
12 Prior literature argues that most accruals earnings management takes place in the last quarter of the fiscal year, 
when incentives to manipulate earnings are the highest (Jacob & Jorgensen 2007). We verify whether our inferences 
hold when we retain only the fourth quarter from the sample, and results indicate a significant decrease in overall 
AbsDA_MJ (coeff.= -0.0073, t-stat=-2.9214) and for AbsDA_MJ if DA_MJ0 (coeff.=-0.0059, t-stat=-1.7354), and 
a decrease significant one-tail at 10% levels in AbsDA_MJ if DA_MJ<0 (-coeff.=0.0053, t-stat=-1.3175). 
13 We also re-estimate these results by including in model (3) a set of industry-year indicator variables and their 
interactions with each of the determinants in model (1), in order to avoid biased estimates (Chen et al 2018). We 
find a significant decrease in the overall AbsDA_MJ (coeff.= -0.0036, t-stat=-3.0497), AbsDA_MJ if DA_MJ0 
(coeff.=-0.0038, t-stat=-1.2562) and AbsDA_MJ if DA_MJ<0 (-coeff.=0.0049, t-stat=-3.2040). 
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unobservable firm-specific characteristics that are relatively stable over time. This modification 
does not alter the inferences of our results.14 Third, we re-estimate our main results replacing the 
current quarter earnings management measure with the next quarter, as well as with the fourth 
quarter measure (i.e., one year ahead). If the relation documented in Table 3 is due to external 
events that affect the decision to manage earnings in that period, then ITR adoption should not 
predict future earnings management. Table 4, panels A and B provides results based on 
discretionary accruals as well as for a set of real earnings management proxies that are described 
in Appendix 2. The results comport with our main findings. This lowers concerns over the 
existence of concurrent events that are spuriously associated with the timing of both the adoption 
of ITRs and the reduction in earnings management. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, to further control for self-selection bias associated with the decision to manage 
earnings, we follow Cohen & Zarowin (2010), Zang (2012), and Chan et al. (2015) and estimate 
a two-stage Heckman (1979) model. First, we model this decision on the matched sample of 
ITR-adopting firms and control firms using the following probit model:  
SuspectEMi,q = α + β1Sizei,q + β2BTMi,q + β3ROAi,q + β4Levi,q + β5NrAnalysti,q + 
β6HabitBeateri,q + β7HabitBeater_di,q+tq+εi,q ,           (4) 
where SuspectEM takes the value 1 if total earnings management is above the industry-year 
median and 0 otherwise. Total earnings management (AbsTotEM1 and AbsTotEM2) is the sum of 
real and accruals earnings management (see Appendix 1 for definitions of variables and 
Appendix 2 for details of the real earnings management measure calculation). HabitBeater 
                                                 
14 In untabulated results, we find that the coefficients of Post x Adopter are -0.0042 (t-stat = -2.3085), -0.0052 (t-stat 
= -2.2395) and -0.0034 (t-stat = -1.4326, significant at one-tail 10% levels) for AbsDA_MJ, AbsDA_MJ if 
DA_MJ0 and AbsDA_MJ if DA_MJ<0, respectively.  
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measures the number of analysts’ forecasts that have been met over the last four quarters, under 
the assumption that firms that usually aim to meet or beat analyst forecasts are likely to continue 
doing so. All other variables have been previously described. Table 5, panel A provides results 
from the above first-stage regression, where we model the probability that a firm is classified as 
SuspectEM. The results suggest that smaller firms with lower profitability (as measured by ROA) 
and lower book-to-market are more likely to be classified as suspect of managing earnings. This 
is consistent with our expectations and in line with prior work. HabitBeater is negative; this is 
not surprising given our definition of SuspectEM, and it suggests that firms that systematically 
just beat analysts’ targets are unlikely to be above the industry median levels for total earnings 
management levels in any given year. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]  
In the second stage, we estimate the following regression on the sample of firms identified as 
suspects in the first stage, and include the Inverse Mills Ratio (InvMills). 
AMi,q=α + β1Postq + β2Adopteri + β3Post x Adopteri,q + β4Controlsi,q +                             
β5InvMillsi,q + νu  + tq + εi,q                             (5) 
Table 5, panel B shows that our main results remain unchanged, consistent with the idea that the 
extent of accruals-based earnings management decreases following the adoption of ITRs.  
Corporate governance 
An alternative explanation to our findings is that firms that improve their governance may 
impose both ITRs and stricter adherence to high-quality GAAP. While there is no significant 
difference between any of the control variables at the point that firms adopt ITRs, as shown in 
Table 2, we conduct an additional analysis to understand whether better corporate governance 
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drives the reduction in discretionary accruals. Specifically, we study changes in the board 
independence (BdIndep) and managerial entrenchment (EIndex) surrounding ITR adoption. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
For this analysis, we use the same PSM sample as for the main test, but additionally require 
non-missing data for board independence and for EIndex.15 Table 6 presents the results from this 
test. We find that entrenchment is lower for non-adopters, suggesting better corporate 
governance after a pseudo-event for non-adopters, and alleviating concerns that changes in 
entrenchment explain our results. In contrast, we find that board independence is higher post-
adoption for both ITR adopters and non-adopters. This reinforces the importance of controlling 
for board independence and entrenchment in our main tests. To further investigate whether this 
may be driving our results, we identify those firms in the PSM sample that go from greater to 
lower board independence in the period following adoption, by comparing the means of BdIndep 
across periods. Of such firms, there are 26 adopters and 19 non-adopters. Using a two-tailed t-
test, we compare the means of our measures of discretionary accruals in the two periods for these 
subsamples. The results are presented in Table 6, panel B. Despite the reduction in board 
independence, ITR adopters have lower earnings management in the post-period, compared to 
the pre-ITR period. This effect is not present in the sample of non-adopters, for which the only 
significant difference is an increase in magnitude of income-increasing accruals. This provides 
some assurance that the restrictions directly affect information quality. However, given the small 
samples, we are cautious not to draw further implications from this test. 
 
                                                 
15 In our main test, to retain as many observations as possible, we replace missing values for these variables by zero 
and include in the model an indicator variable that takes the value 1 when this is the case; and 0 otherwise. This is 
why mean values reported in panel A, Table 6 differ from those in Table 2, panels B and C. 
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Additional analyses 
Voluntary ITRs and real earnings management 
Earnings may be managed by structuring transactions (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Indeed, a 
growing literature suggests that managers may prefer to take real operating and investment 
decisions to manage earnings (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). This literature provides 
evidence that managers attempt to achieve earnings targets either via accruals manipulation, with 
no direct cash flow consequences (like under-provisioning for bad-debt expenses or delaying 
asset write-offs), or via real transaction management, which affect cash flows and are usually 
considered costlier (like giving price discounts or cutting discretionary expenditures).  
This work documents a substitution between reduced accruals management and increased 
real earnings management (REM), and provides compelling evidence that managers trade off the 
benefits and costs of using different instruments to manage earnings, selecting those that lower 
net costs (Zang, 2012). This substitution is particularly likely following corporate governance 
changes that aim at improving accounting quality, but fail to reduce the overall incentives for 
earnings management, thereby triggering a switch between instruments as the net costs of 
accruals earnings management become steeper. For example, the rational expectation 
equilibrium model developed by Ewert & Wagenhofer (2005) shows that an unwanted 
consequence of tighter accounting standards that limit discretion over accruals is that they may 
induce managers to resort to REM. Consistent with this prediction, Cohen et al. (2008) find that, 
following the passage of SOX, accruals management decreased while REM increased, and Chan 
et al. (2015) document this substitution effect after companies adopt voluntary compensation 
recovery policies (also known as claw-backs).  
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These studies indicate that corporate governance improvements represent shocks to earnings 
management instruments but may be ineffective in reducing total earnings management, as they 
may simply motivate a shift in earnings management practices. Under H1, we expect that self-
adopted ITRs represent a shock to managerial incentives to trade and therefore to managing 
earnings. Thus, we expect that no significant substitution will emerge as a consequence of ITRs. 
There are at least three reasons to explain this. First, ITRs restrict the window for when insiders 
can trade. As noted before, this decreases the opportunities to trade on private information and 
generally means that earnings management via any means is rendered less effective. Second, a 
consequence of imposing retricted windows is that any earning management strategy needs to be 
carefully timed. A limitation of REM practices is that they must be taken during the fiscal year to 
impact reported earnings, while accruals-based decisions may be delayed until the financial 
statements are prepared (Zang, 2012). This further limits the usefulness of REM in the presence 
of ITRs. More generally, as noted in the extant literature, REM actions are costly practices that 
may lower firm value and damage the firm competitive advantage. Thus, managers with a long-
term horizon and stock-option plans over a number of years likely prefer accruals-based 
practices that do not damage the firm’s cash flow generation potential.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
We compute the real earnings management measures as explained in Appendix 2. Table 7 
presents the results from this analysis. Panels A and B show that REM measures are not 
significantly different after ITR adoption for adopting firms relative to control firms, indicating, 
as discussed above, that REM may not be a preferred mechanism for generating insider trading 
gains in either period. However, the negative and significant coefficient of Post x Adopter in 
columns 3 and 4 do indicate a significant reduction in overall earnings management. For the 
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individual measures of REM, reported in panel C, the coefficient is negative and significant for 
AbsABCash.  
Firms might combine accruals and REM to achieve their strategy (Cohen, 2008; Doukakis, 
2014). Therefore, we additionally control for accruals management in our REM tests (columns 2 
and 4 of panels A and B). In panel D, we include a REM proxy as an additional control to our 
main specification from equation (2). Our inferences do not change. Taken together, our results 
are consistent with a decrease in managerial incentives for earnings management following the 
introduction of blackout periods. Overall, this indicates that voluntary ITRs likely limit the 
opportunities to profit from earnings management of any type. This is an interesting finding, 
given concurrent research that suggests a limited effectiveness of other voluntary corporate 
policies, such as claw-backs, which create a substitution between earnings management practices 
(Chan et al., 2015). By imposing a window that restricts the opportunities to profit from 
information asymmetry surrounding earnings announcements, ITRs appear to improve the 
quality of financial reporting in a more comprehensive way than other policies.  
Earnings targets, timeliness of loss recognition, and earnings restatements 
Next, we test whether our results hold for other established measures of earnings quality.  
First, we analyze earnings targets. Bhojraj et al. (2009) show that abnormal reductions in 
expenditures to beat analysts’ forecasts are associated with greater subsequent insider selling. 
That is, insiders appear to manage earnings upward to meet targets, thereby inflating prices 
before selling their shares. We test whether voluntary ITRs reduce this behavior. Admittedly, 
target beating may happen without manipulation, by guiding analysts to lower their earnings 
forecasts, but importantly and to the point of our analyses, it can be achieved through managing 
earnings. We aim to identify the effects of ITRs on this latter behavior by using three measures 
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of earnings quality developed by Bhojraj et al. (2009): (1) if a firm has a change in R&D scaled 
by total assets above the median for all firms in the same one-digit SIC industry code and year 
(q_R&D=1), (2) if a firm has a change in advertising expenditure above the median for all firms 
in the same one-digit SIC industry code and year (q_Adv=1), and (3) if discretionary accruals are 
below the median for all firms in the same one-digit SIC industry industry code and year 
(q_DA=1). We aggregate these three variables and create a quality indicator, Qual, which takes 
the value of 1 if the sum of the three individual indicators is 2 or greater; and zero otherwise.16 
We test the effect of voluntary ITRs on the propensity to use low quality earnings to just 
meet or beat earnings target by using the following probit model and the same control variables 
identified in our main tests. 
Low_Qual_Beateri,q = α + β1Postq + β2Adopteri + β3Post x Adopteri,q  
+ β4 Controlsi,q + εi,q,             (6) 
where Low_Qual_Beater takes the value 1 if a firm just meets or beats the earnings target 
(reported actual earnings per share are no lower than half a cent below the forecast) and has low 
quality earnings (Qual=0); and 0 otherwise. We also replace the quality indicator with the 
measures for q_R&D and q_DA to generate the dependent variables Low_R&D_Qual_Beater 
and Low_DA_Qual_Beater. A significant negative (positive) β3 coefficient would indicate a 
reduced (increased) probability that the firm uses low quality earnings to just meet or beat 
earnings targets after voluntarily adopting ITRs.  
The results of this test are reported in Table 8, panel A. They show that, after ITR adoption, 
firms are less likely to meet or beat earnings targets by reporting low quality earnings as 
                                                 
16
 We do not have enough data on advertisement expenditure to create any meaningful analysis using this measure in 
isolation, but it forms part of the composite measure.  
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indicated by the negative significant coefficients of Post x Adopter for Low_Qual_Beater and 
Low_R&D_Qual_Beater. This corroborates our previous findings.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Second, we examine the timeliness of loss recognition following the adoption of ITRs. If 
managers have to wait to trade until after the earnings announcement, they may delay bad news 
to maintain the stock price level. Therefore, we test whether managers substitute earnings 
management for timely loss recognition tactics. Our measure of timeliness is based on Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005).17 Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
ACCi,q = β1+ β2dREVi,q+ β3GPPEi,q + β4DCFi,q + β5CFi,q + β6Posti,q+ β7Adopteri 
+β8CFi,qDCFi,q+ β9 CFi,q Posti,q+ β10 CFi,q Adopteri +β11 DCFi,q Posti,q 
+ β12 DCFi,q Adopteri+ β13 Posti,q x Adopteri+ β14 CFi,q Posti,q x Adopteri 
+ β15 CFi,q Posti,t Reti,q+ β16 CFi,q DCFi,q Adopteri+ β17 DCFi,q Posti,q x Adopteri 
+ β18 DCFi,q CFi,q Posti,q x Adopteri+εi,q             (7) 
ACC is accruals scaled by average total assets, dREV is the change in revenue scaled by average 
total assets, GPPE is gross property, plant and equipment scaled by average total assets, CF is 
the industry median adjusted cash flow from operations scaled by average total assets, and DCF 
is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if CF is negative and 0 otherwise. (See Appendix 1 for 
definitions.) This equation is estimated on a quarterly basis. The coefficient of interest is β18, 
which measures the incremental timeliness of accruals in recognizing negative cash flow news 
relative to positive cash flow news for adopting firms relative to control firms in the post-
                                                 
17 We do not use Basu’s (1997) market-based model because it relies on prices, which are likely correlated with 
insider trading, and therefore it might capture a mechanical relation between deferral of bad news and insider 
trading. In unreported tests, we use Basu’s model based on annual earnings per share before extraordinary items 
deflated by beginning of period price to capture the incremental timeliness of earnings in recognizing bad news 
relative to good news for adopters versus non-adopters in the period after ITR adoption. We find that the difference 
between groups is not significant using this measure.  
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adoption period. The results are presented in Table 8, panel B. We find evidence of an 
incremental timeliness in loss recognition for adopters versus non-adopters in the period after 
ITR, consistent with our prior findings that accounting quality generally improves after ITRs. 
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 8, panels A and B suggests managers are not more 
likely to defer the recognition of bad news after ITR adoption, since witholding bad news would 
lead to an increased probability of target beating, and a decrease in loss timeliness. 
Third, we turn our attention to earnings restatements. While earnings management proxies 
can be noisy in reflecting the quality of financial reporting, earnings restatements provide an ex-
post identification of earnings management where, apart from corrections of mistakes, firms 
disclose past inaccuracies in preparing their financial statements (Chiu, Teoh, & Tian, 2013; 
Kedia & Rajgopal, 2011). Restatements can hence be understood as an extreme case of earnings 
management, and thus, finding that the likelihood of restatements is lower after firms adopt ITRs 
would support our hypothesis. We collect annual restatements data from AuditAnalytics, which 
reduces our sample to 9,140 observations with full data available, due to differences in coverage 
across databases. The variable Restate is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for the 
yearly observations starting from the year when the firm has had a restatement, and 0 before that 
year, as well as for all observations that correspond to firms that have not had any restatements 
throughout our sample period (Abbott, Parker, & Presley, 2012; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005).18 We 
estimate a simple logit regression of the probability that a firm restates its earnings (Restate=1) 
where the control variables are based on Abbott et al. (2012) and described in Appendix 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
18 For example, if a firm has its first restatement in 2005, Restate would take the value 0 for all the firm-year 
observations prior to 2004, and the value 1 starting in 2005. 
29 
Table 9 shows that ITR adopters tend to be less likely to restate their earnings targets 
following the adoption of ITRs than their control counterparts, as indicated by the negative 
significant coefficient of Post x Adopter. This is in line with our previous results. 
Alternative identification of ITR adoption 
Several aspects may introduce noise in our ITR adoption measure. Our main ITR measure allows 
for some trades to happen in the restricted periods after identified adoption. This is to 
accommodate the fact that the precise length of individual firm-level blackouts is unknown, and 
because the extant literature generally agrees that the adoption of blackout periods does not 
completely eliminate trading during restricted periods. In fact, Ali & Hirshleifer (2017) show 
that insiders that are considered opportunistic given their trading patterns during the period 
before an earnings announcement trade profitably in future periods. Also, the SEC Rule 10b5-1 
enacted in 2000 allows insiders to announce trades in advance, thereby providing a defense 
against accusations of opportunistically timing trades to use private information (Jagolinzer, 
2009). This could interfere with the observed trading patterns that we use in developing our main 
ITR measure, because a pre-announced trade may happen in the blackout period without 
contradicting the policy. Overall, these two concerns, when jointly considered, mean that some 
non-adopters may be misclassified as voluntary adopters in our sample. In our view, such a 
misclassification would bias against finding evidence of ITRs’ effects. Still, we take the 
following steps in addressing them. First, we restrict our sample to the pre-2000 period, before 
these pre-approved plans existed, and repeat our main analysis. Untabulated results show the 
same decrease in earnings management in the period following the adoption of ITRs (with a 
coefficient of Post x Adopter of -0.0062, t-stat = -2.3162).  
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Second, we conduct a further robustness check and repeat our analyses using an 
alternative measure of ITRs that is more restrictive. Specifically, we require that at least 75 
percent of insider trades happen in the safe trading period in every quarter following adoption.19 
This definition of ITR adopters is less likely to misclassify non-adopters as adopters. Those 
adopters that do not consistently enforce the policy or that allow insider trading in the restricted 
period if trades are pre-announced under Rule 10b5-1 will be classified as non-adopters. 
Furthermore, we require that there is no missing data for the control variables. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]  
Because the sample of firms identified as adopters using this more restrictive definition is 
significantly smaller, we use a reduced propensity score matching procedure to obtain a 
comparable sample of firms. The results are reported in panel A, Table 10. Panel B shows the 
ITR-adopting firms and control firms are similar, and panel C shows the coefficient for Post x 
Adopter is negative and significant, corroborating our main finding of a reduction in absolute 
discretionary accruals after voluntary ITR adoption.  
 
Conclusions 
We examine whether firms that voluntarily adopt ITRs enjoy lower earnings management. We 
build on prior work to identify all US firms that voluntarily adopt and enforce these ITRs. To 
alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use propensity score matching to create a matched-pair 
research design that allows us to identify firms that resemble the ITR-adopting firms but do not 
adopt trading restrictions (control firms). Our results indicate that firms that voluntarily adopt 
ITRs have lower earnings management than their matched controls in the post-event period.  
                                                 
19 Jagolinzer et al. (2011) report that there is still some insider trading during blackout windows contrary to insider 
trading policy. Our measure thus allows for some instances in which insiders might trade in the blackout period. 
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We also show that voluntary adoption is not associated with a substitution between accruals 
and real earnings management, and we document a reduction in the total level of earnings 
management. Furthermore, we find a decrease in the use of low quality earnings to meet or beat 
targets, and a reduction in the likelihood of earnings restatements following ITR adoption. We do 
not find a greater deferral of bad news. Thus, our results provide novel insights regarding a 
question left unanswered by previous studies that documented that a large percentage of the 
firms in S&P 500 voluntarily adopt ITRs, despite finding no consistent answers as to why. Our 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that insider trading opportunities create incentives for 
insiders to negatively influence the quality of financial statements disclosed by their company.  
Our study is not without limitations. ITRs are usually not directly observable, and therefore 
we employ an indirect proxy of whether a firm has such restrictions in place. We develop our 
proxy for ITRs building on previous work that has identified that restricted firms allow trading 
only during a limited window following earnings announcements. While the measure we use has 
the advantage of reflecting the actual trading patterns of insiders, it may misclassify some firms, 
given that firms may establish different blackout windows. We validate our measure by manually 
checking the insider trading policies for a random subsample of firms. But, despite our efforts to 
alleviate endogeneity concerns, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that other corporate 
events may be (partly) responsible for our results. The results presented are consistent with the 
idea that earnings management is partly justified by insider trading incentives. Overall, our 
findings provide evidence that, when firms prevent insiders from trading in the shares of the 
company, there is a reduction in earnings management.   
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Appendix 1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
AbsABCash the absolute value of abnormal cash flow from operations, see Appendix 2 for 
details. 
AbsABExp the absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenses, see Appendix 2 for details. 
AbsABProd the absolute value of abnormal production, see Appendix 2 for details. 
AbsDA_MJ the absolute value of abnormal accruals (DA_MJ).  
AbsRTM1 the absolute value of the first real transaction management proxy (RTM1). 
AbsRTM2 the absolute value of the second real transaction management proxy (RTM2). 
AbsTotEM1 the sum of AbsDA_MJ and AbsRTM1. 
AbsTotEM2 the sum of AbsDA_MJ and AbsRTM2. 
ACC accruals scaled by average total assets. 
Adopter an indicator variable that takes value one for firms in which PercentageSafe changes 
from a mean value below 50 percent in the period before a quarter where it rises to at 
least 75 percent and has a mean above 50 percent thereafter. 
AM one of our earnings management proxies described above. 
Analyst_d an indicator variable that takes the value one when NrAnalyst is missing, and zero 
otherwise. 
BdIndep board independence, computed as the number of independent directors divided by 
the total number of directors on the board; it takes the value zero when data is 
missing. 
BdIndep _d an indicator variable that takes the value one when data on independent directors is 
missing, and zero otherwise. 
BIG4 an indicator variable that takes the value one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 
4 auditing firms, and zero otherwise.  
BTM firms book value divided by the market value of common equity.  
CF the industry median-adjusted operating cash flow, scaled by average total assets. 
DA_MJ abnormal accruals computed based on the modified Jones model described in 
Equation (1). 
DCF an indicator variable taking the value one if CF < 0. 
dREV the change in revenue, scaled by average total assets. 
EIndex the value of the entrenchment index (EIndex) developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009). 
EIndex_d an indicator variable that takes the value one if InvEIndex is missing and zero 
otherwise. 
EventDate identifies when firms start to apply blackout periods as the quarter when the largest 
increase in PercentageSafe was recorded compared to the average values of 
PercentageSafe for the firm up to date. A firm is considered to restrict insider 
trading if during all the quarters following EventDate, PercentageSafe is maintained 
at a minimum level of 75 percent (that is, minimum 75percent of all quarterly trades 
take place in the allowed trading window). Firms that restrict insider trading 
according to this definition represent our ITR adopting group of firms. 
Execucomp_d an indicator variable taking the value one if the firm is covered by ExecuComp and 
zero otherwise. 
GPPE gross property, plant and equipment, scaled by average total assets.  
Growth sales growth, computed as sales at the end of the current year minus sales at the 
beginning of the current year, scaled by the sales at the beginning of the current year. 
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InstOwner the percentage shares owned by institutional investors; when data on institutional 
ownership is missing, the variable takes the value zero. 
InstOwner_d an indicator variable that takes the value one when data on institutional investors is 
missing, and zero otherwise. 
InvEIndex the value of the entrenchment index (EIndex) developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009), 
multiplied by (-1). InvEIndex is assigned the value zero when EIndex is missing. 
InvMills Inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from equation (4). 
ITR an indicator variable that takes the value one if the firm has blackout periods in 
place, and otherwise zero. 
HabitBeater number of analysts’ forecasts that have been met over the last four quarters.  
HabitBeater_d an indicator variable that takes the value one when HabitBeater is missing, and zero 
otherwise. 
Lev the firm’s leverage, computed as the sum between debt in current and long term 
liabilities, scaled by total assets. 
LowDA_QualBeater an indicator variable that takes the value one if a firm just beats the earnings targets, 
i.e. reported actual earnings per share are no lower than half a cent below the 
forecast, and has discretionary accruals are above the median for all firms in the 
same one-digit SIC industry and year (i.e., q_DA=0). 
LowQualBeater an indicator variable that takes the value one if a firm just beats the earnings targets, 
i.e. reported actual earnings per share are no lower than half a cent below the 
forecast, and has low quality earnings. 
LowR&D_QualBeater an indicator variable that takes the value one if a firm just beats the earnings targets, 
i.e. reported actual earnings per share are no lower than half a cent below the 
forecast, and has a change in R&D scaled by total assets below the median for all 
firms in the same one-digit SIC industry and year (i.e., q_R&D=0). 
NOA net operating assets, computed as shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable 
securities plus total debt.   
NrAnalyst the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm at the end of the 
previous quarter. 
PercentageSafe the ratio of number of trades taking place during the allowed trading window to the 
total number of trades during the period between two consecutive earnings 
announcements.  
Post an indicator variable for whether the observation is after the insider trading 
restrictions period; it takes the value one in the quarters following the event, zero 
before the event and a missing value in the event quarter.  
q_Adv an indicator variable that takes the value one if a firm has a change in advertising 
expenditure above the median for all firms in the same one-digit SIC industry and 
year, and zero otherwise. 
q_DA an indicator variable that takes the value one if discretionary accruals are below the 
median for all firms in the same one-digit SIC industry and year, and zero otherwise. 
q_R&D an indicator variable that takes the value one if a firm has a change in R&D scaled 
by total assets above the median for all firms in the same one-digit SIC industry and 
year, and zero otherwise. 
Qual an indicator variable that takes the value one if (q_R&D+q_Adv+q_DA) is greater or 
equal than two, and zero otherwise. 
Restate an indicator variable that takes the value one if the firm has experienced a financial 
restatement up until that year, and zero otherwise. 
Restricted an indicator variable taking the value one if the trade takes place in the restricted 
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period, and zero otherwise.  
ROA income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. 
RTM1 RTM1 = ABProd - ABExp (Zang, 2012). 
RTM2 RTM2 = - ABCash - ABExp (Zang, 2012). 
r10b5 an indicator variable taking the value zero before the observation is before 2003 
when Rule 10b-5 was adopted, and one afterwards. 
Size the logarithm of market equity.  
Sigma_CFO the standard deviation of cash flows deflated by lagged total assets over the last 4 
quarters (see Hribar & Nichols, 2007). 
Sigma_REV the standard deviation of sales deflated by lagged total assets over the last 4 quarters 
(see Hribar & Nichols, 2007). 
SuspectEM an indicator variable taking the value one if total earnings management (AbsTotEM1 
and AbsTotEM2) is above the industry-year median, and zero0 otherwise. 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q = (Total Assets – Book value of common stock + Market value of 
common stock)/Total Assets. 
TotalComp total compensation as reported in ExecuComp, divided by 1000 to use the same units 
as in Compustat (tdc1/1000). 
Tenure CEO tenure (in number of years) based on Execucomp data. 
ZScore the decile of Altman’s Z-score, where Z-score is computed as 3.3 * Net 
Income/Assets + Sales/Assets + 1.4 * Retained earnings/Assets + 1.2 * Working 





Appendix 2. Real earnings management measure 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we compute three proxies of real transaction management, 
measuring abnormal levels of discretionary expenses as well as cash flow from operating 
expenses and production. Our measures are given by the residuals from estimating Equations 
(A2.1), (A2.2), and (A2.3) by quarter and two-digit SIC code for the entire universe of 





































+εi,q           (A2.3) 
 Roychowdhury (2006) states that managers may boost short-term earnings by (1) 
reducing discretionary expenditures such as R&D or advertising, (2) manipulating sales via price 
discounts or more lenient credit terms that accelerate sales, and inflate sales revenue although 
these practices may decrease operating cash flow, or (3) overproduction to spread fixed overhead 
costs over more units.  
Following Cohen & Zarowin (2010), and Chan et al. (2015), we compute three individual 
real earnings management measures: ABExp, ABCash, and ABProd. To capture the total effects 
of real earnings management, we follow Zang (2012) and Ipino and Parbonetti (2017) and compute 
a first real earnings management measure, RTM1, we multiply ABExp by minus one (such that 
higher values indicate higher likelyhood that the firm reduces discretionary expenses), and add it 
to ABProd (i.e., RTM1=ABProd – ABExp). For the second measure, RTM2,  we multiply both 
ABExp and ABCash by minus one (such that higher amounts reflect higher likelihood for real 
earnings management) and take the sum (i.e., RTM2=–ABCash – ABExp. Our real earnings 
management proxies (AbsRTM1 and AbsRTM2) are given by the absolute value of the respective 
residuals, so that they reflect the extent, rather than the direction, of earnings manipulation.  
Finally, we measure total earnings management, AbsTotEM1 (AbsTotEM2), as the sum between 
AbsRTM1 (AbsRTM2) and AbsDA_MJ. Using these proxies, we repeat our main analyses. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
    All Firms Adopters 
Non-
adopters 
Firms in Compustat and Thomson Financial Insider Filings, 1996-2012 11,215   
       
 Less: Financial firms (2,519) 8,696   
  Early adopters (511) 8,185 3,641 4,544 
  Firms with data for less than seven quarters (1,094) 7,091 2,872 4,219 
  Firms with missing data for ITR determinants (3,441) 3,650 732 2,918 
  Adopters without data in both periods (129) 3,521 603 2,918 
       
PSM matched sample:   1,132 566 566 




Table 2. Propensity score matched sample 
Panel A. Determinants of ITR adoption for Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
Variables Adopters t-stat 
Size 0.1268*** (21.5761) 
BTM -0.0031 (-0.3172) 
ROA 1.0679*** (10.7323) 
Lev -0.1319** (-2.5402) 
InstOwner 0.0193 (0.3905) 
InstOwner_d -0.0007 (-0.0277) 
BdIndep 0.2157*** (2.8571) 
BdIndep_d -0.2345*** (-4.3030) 
InvEIndex -0.0106 (-0.5300) 
EIndex_d -0.0408 (-0.7081) 
TotalComp 0.0000* (1.6770) 
Tenure -0.0168*** (-6.2214) 
Execucomp_d -0.1106*** (-3.5936) 
ZScore -0.0154*** (-3.9373) 
Growth -0.0191** (-2.1426) 
NrAnalyst -0.0235 (-1.5972) 
Analyst_d -0.1613*** (-6.7600) 
Constant -0.6088*** (-4.8147) 
   
Industry and year FE Yes  
Pseudo R-squared 0.1789  
N 49,769  
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for ITR adopters and Non-adopters in the year of the PSM 
    Mean 
Variables   Adopters Non-adopters p-value 
Size  5.614 5.614 0.997 
BTM  0.593 0.668 0.136 
ROA  0.003 0.003 0.927 
NOA  3.392 4.032 0.137 
InstOwner  0.020 0.022 0.843 
BdIndep  0.170 0.196 0.225 
InvEindex  -0.158 -0.173 0.740 
NrAnalyst  1.117 1.160 0.529 
ZScore  5.136 5.372 0.210 
Sigma_CFO  0.041 0.040 0.707 
Sigma_REV   0.106 0.090 0.163 
Growth  0.275 0.261 0.777 
Lev  0.254 0.247 0.641 
TotalComp  0.726 1.053 0.112 
Tenure   0.820 0.903 0.639 
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Table 2. (cont’d) 
Panel C. Descriptive statistics for the ITR adopters and Non-adopters in the PSM sample 
Non-adopters N Mean SD Median Min Max 
AbsDA_MJ 9466 0.030 0.042 0.018 0 0.453 
AbsRTM1 9466 0.058 0.068 0.040 0 0.642 
AbsRTM2 9466 0.050 0.075 0.034 0 2.571 
AbsTotEM1 9466 0.088 0.096 0.062 0.001 1.044 
AbsTotEM2 9466 0.080 0.094 0.058 0 2.589 
Size 9466 6.39 2.123 6.467 0.672 11.252 
BTM 9466 0.608 0.754 0.468 -5.646 6.628 
ROA 9466 0.003 0.057 0.012 -0.582 0.171 
NOA 9466 3.902 5.463 2.470 -4.518 106.333 
InstOwner 9466 0.105 0.248 0 0 0.999 
BdIndep 9466 0.294 0.353 0 0 1 
InvEindex 9466 -0.321 0.958 0 -5 0 
NrAnalyst 9466 1.467 1.130 1.609 0 3.761 
ZScore 9466 5.863 2.998 6 1 10 
Sigma_CFO 9466 0.028 0.033 0.019 0 1.037 
Sigma_REV 9466 0.072 0.236 0.035 0 5.829 
r10b5 9466 0.672 0.470 1 0 1 
BIG4 9466 0.756 0.430 1 0 1 
Lev 9466 0.237 0.202 0.204 0 1.597 
       
Adopters N Mean SD Median Min Max 
AbsDA_MJ 18092 0.036 0.048 0.021 0 0.453 
AbsRTM1 18092 0.063 0.071 0.043 0 0.642 
AbsRTM2 18092 0.056 0.070 0.038 0 2.571 
AbsTotEM1 18092 0.100 0.105 0.069 0 1.044 
AbsTotEM2 18092 0.092 0.097 0.064 0 2.595 
Size 18092 5.888 2.039 5.944 0.534 11.212 
BTM 18092 0.614 0.603 0.500 -5.646 6.628 
ROA 18092 0.003 0.052 0.011 -0.582 0.171 
NOA 18092 3.143 3.997 2.231 -5.131 106.333 
InstOwner 18092 0.111 0.256 0 0 1 
BdIndep 18092 0.258 0.354 0 0 1 
InvEindex 18092 -0.216 0.789 0 -5 0 
NrAnalyst 18092 1.316 1.066 1.386 0 3.714 
ZScore 18092 5.468 2.757 6 1 10 
Sigma_CFO 18092 0.035 0.049 0.024 0 2.226 
Sigma_REV 18092 0.087 0.441 0.049 0 35.364 
r10b5 18092 0.648 0.478 1 0 1 
BIG4 18092 0.740 0.439 1 0 1 
Lev 18092 0.242 0.197 0.219 0 1.574 
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Table 2. (cont’d) 
Panel D. Industry distribution of adopters 
Industry Number of adopters Percentage 
Chemicals 22 3.89% 
Consumer 128 22.61% 
Energy 37 6.54% 
Health 141 24.91% 
Manufacture 77 13.60% 
Other 148 26.15% 
Technology 13 2.30% 
Total 566 100.00% 
Panel E. Firm performance and CEO compensation before and after ITR adoption for adopters  
Variables Before ITRs After ITRs p-value 
BTM 0.607 0,618 0.194 
ROA 0.003 0.002 0.308 
ZScore 0.451 0.496 0.080 
Tobin's Q 1.944 1.816 0.000 
TotalComp 0.417 0.977 0.000 
Table 2, Panel A presents the results of the following probit model: PROB(Adopter = 1) = 1/(1+e-ßX), where βX=α0+ 
α1Size +α2BTM +α3ROA +α4Lev +α5InstOwner +α6InstOwner_d +α7BdIndep +α8BdIndep_d +α9InvEIndex 
+α10EIndex_d +α11TotalComp +α12Tenure +α13Execucomp_d +α14ZScore +α15NrAnalyst +α16Analyst_d 
+α17Growth +η +t +ε, and η and t are industry and year fixed effects, respectively. This model is estimated for the 
entire sample of observations that have at least one observation before and one after the adoption quarter for treatment 
firms (603 distinct firms), and all available quarters for control firms (2918 distinct firms) that we will select the 
matched sample from. In order to select the matched pairs, we estimate the model in equation (2) for each year 
separately. Z-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel B shows the mean and median of the observable characteristics of the sample of adopters and the propensity 
score matched control sample in the EventDate (pseudo-event) for adopters (non-adopters). Panel C shows the 
descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis for the 566 matched pairs. Panel D shows the industry 
distribution of the adopting firms, and panel E shows their firm performance and CEO compensation before and after 
ITR adoption. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 3. The effect of ITR adoption on earnings management 
 AbsDA_MJ AbsDA_MJ if DA_MJ0 AbsDA_MJ if DA_MJ<0 
Post 0.0010 0.0007 0.0012 
 (0.8892) (0.4693) (0.7745) 
Adopter 0.0042*** 0.0011 0.0072*** 
 (3.1467) (0.5918) (4.2385) 
Post x Adopter -0.0047*** -0.0043** -0.0052*** 
 (-3.2152) (-2.2758) (-2.8605) 
Size -0.0002 -0.0022*** 0.0015*** 
 (-0.5201) (-4.4444) (2.8590) 
BTM -0.0042*** -0.0054*** -0.0014 
 (-5.0625) (-4.8840) (-1.4606) 
ROA -0.2285*** 0.1449*** -0.3667*** 
 (-11.0058) (3.8876) (-15.1822) 
NOA -0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0003** 
 (-2.5233) (1.1050) (-2.2860) 
InstOwner -0.0009 0.0018 -0.0044 
 (-0.3269) (0.4843) (-1.1958) 
InstOwner_d -0.0018 0.0025 -0.0063** 
 (-1.0279) (1.0231) (-2.4432) 
BdIndep 0.0036 0.0083* -0.0007 
 (1.0097) (1.8705) (-0.1659) 
BdIndep_d 0.0056** 0.0088*** 0.0014 
 (2.1638) (2.6102) (0.4976) 
InvEIndex 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 
 (0.0905) (0.0287) (0.4627) 
EIndex_d 0.0032 0.0028 0.0028 
 (1.5181) (0.8696) (1.0737) 
NrAnalyst -0.0019** -0.0018* -0.0018 
 (-2.2595) (-1.8465) (-1.5987) 
Analyst_d -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0017 
 (-0.8525) (-0.8466) (-0.8117) 
ZScore 0.0006** -0.0008*** 0.0013*** 
 (2.2557) (-2.6064) (4.0526) 
Sigma_CFO 0.2486*** 0.2465*** 0.2696*** 
 (3.3359) (3.1779) (3.5355) 
Sigma_REV -0.0044 -0.0001 -0.0069*** 
 (-1.4064) (-0.0130) (-2.7433) 
r10b5 0.0039 0.0054 -0.0004 
 (1.4348) (1.5436) (-0.0890) 
BIG4 -0.0018 -0.0014 -0.0019 
 (-1.5489) (-1.0407) (-1.3582) 
Lev -0.0007 -0.0026 0.0014 
 (-0.2640) (-0.6957) (0.3918) 
Constant -0.0064 -0.0028 -0.0100 
 (-0.7268) (-0.2477) (-1.1080) 
    
Industry and qtr. FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.2647 0.2372 0.4156 
Observations 27,558 14,585 12,973 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (3) on the PSM sample. Industry and quarter fixed effects are 
included. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
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Table 4. Future earnings management for the matched sample 
Panel A. Next quarter earnings management  
Variables AbsDA_MJ AbsRTM1 AbsRTM2 AbsTotEM1 AbsTotEM2 
Post 0.0013 -0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0017 
 (0.9837) (-0.7013) (-0.0564) (-0.0548) (0.5713) 
Adopter 0.0025 -0.0019 -0.0006 0.0002 0.0020 
 (1.6256) (-0.5156) (-0.1746) (0.0562) (0.5503) 
Post x Adopter -0.0040** -0.0019 -0.0031 -0.0047 -0.0068* 
 (-2.3918) (-0.5806) (-0.8773) (-1.1848) (-1.7946) 
Constant 0.0116 0.0635*** 0.0296*** 0.0720*** 0.0411*** 
 (1.4478) (4.6773) (2.6219) (4.1136) (2.7703) 
      
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and qtr. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.1762 0.2498 0.1766 0.2183 0.1782 
N 24,662 24,662 24,662 24,662 24,662 
Panel B. Next year earnings management  
Variables AbsDA_MJ AbsRTM1 AbsRTM2 AbsTotEM1  AbsTotEM2 
Post 0.0015 -0.0025 -0.0018 -0.0000 0.0001 
 (1.0558) (-0.9566) (-0.6383) (-0.0011) (0.0221) 
Adopter 0.0022 -0.0027 -0.0017 -0.0001 0.0013 
 (1.4022) (-0.6726) (-0.4262) (-0.0122) (0.3344) 
Post x Adopter -0.0042** -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0059 † -0.0056† 
 (-2.5110) (-0.6028) (-0.3010) (-1.4397) (-1.3606) 
Constant 0.0175** 0.0842*** 0.0561*** 0.0847*** 0.0614*** 
 (2.1001) (6.0710) (4.8583) (5.2757) (4.4557) 
      
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and qtr. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.1819 0.2503 0.1690 0.2210 0.1738 
N 24,150 24,150 24,150 24,150 24,150 
Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (3) using as dependent variables the discretionary, real and total 
earnings management measures for next quarter (panel A), and for the next year (panel B). The vector of controls 
included in both panels consists of the following variables: Size, BTM, ROA, NOA, InstOwner, InstOwner_d, BdIndep, 
BdIndep_d, InvEIndex, EIndex_d, NrAnalyst, Analyst_d, ZScore, Sigma_CFO, Sigma_REV, BIG4, Lev, and r10b5. 
Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, and † indicates one-sided significance at the 10% level. Robust standard 





Table 5. Inverse Mills on PSM sample 




















Pseudo R-squared 0,0145 
Qtr. FE Yes 
N 36619 
Panel B. Inverse Mills test, second stage 
Variables AbsDA_MJ AbsDA_MJ if DA_MJ0 AbsDA_MJ if DA_MJ <0 
Post 0.0008 0.0015 0.0009 
 (0.5315) (0.7361) (0.4917) 
Adopter 0.0074*** 0.0054** 0.0092*** 
 (4.1993) (2.3163) (4.0376) 
Post x Adopter -0.0049** -0.0052** -0.0057** 
 (-2.4383) (-2.0833) (-2.4507) 
InvMills 0.0023 0.0134 -0.0529 
 -0.0496 -0.2600 (-0.8347) 
Constant -0.0125 -0.0161 0.0012 
 (-0.6763) (-0.7929) -0.047 
    
Controls included Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and qtr. FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0,3405 0,3139 0,4925 
N 18,391 9,713 8,678 
Table 5 presents the results of a two-stage model to control for firms’ endogenous decisions to manage earnings. Panel 
A shows the results of estimating the probit model in equation (4) on the PSM sample. Z-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. Panel B shows the results of estimating equation (5) on the sample of firms classified in the first stage as 
being suspect of managing earnings (i.e., SuspectEM=1). The vector of controls included in panel B includes: Size, 
BTM, ROA, NOA, InstOwner, InstOwner_d, BdIndep, BdIndep_d, InvEIndex, EIndex_d, NrAnalyst, Analyst_d, 
ZScore, Sigma_CFO, Sigma_REV, BIG4, Lev, and r10b5. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Variables 
are defined in Appendix 1.  
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Table 6. Changes in corporate governance 
Panel A: Differences in means of corporate governance variables means between ITR adopters and non-adopters 
 BdIndep  EIndex 
 Pre-period Post-period Diff  Pre-period Post-period Diff 
 N Mean N Mean p-value  N Mean N Mean p-value 
Adopters and non-adopters 4,926 0.645 8,007 0.715 0.000  1,593 2.558 1,740 2.479 0.073 
Adopters 2,311 0.658 4,465 0.720 0.000  715 2.459 910 2.443 0.802 
Non-adopters 2,615 0.634 3,542 0.708 0.000  878 2.639 830 2.520 0.050 
Panel B: Differences in means of AbsDA_MJ for firms that record a drop in board independence 
 Adopters (N=26)  Non-adopters (N=19) 
 Pre-period Post-period Diff  Pre-period Post-period Diff 
 N Mean N Mean p-value  N Mean N Mean p-value 
AbsDA_MJ 557 0.034 350 0.024 0.000  498 0.027 416 0.025 0.449 
DA_MJ 557 0.003 350 0.001 0.493  498 0.004 416 0.001 0.193 
DA_MJ >= 0 295 0.034 197 0.022 0.000  267 0.029 227 0.023 0.058 
DA_MJ < 0 262 -0.033 153 -0.027 0.160  231 -0.024 189 -0.027 0.469 
Table 6 Panel A shows the differences in corporate governance variables (BdIndep and EIndex) in the propensity score matched sample. Panel B shows the 
differences in the means of discretionary accruals before and after ITR adoption for those firms in the propensity score matched sample that go from higher to 
lower board independence. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 7. The effect of ITRs on real and total earnings management 
Panel A. The effect of ITRs on RTM1 and TotalEM1 
Variables AbsRTM1 AbsRTM1 AbsTotEM1 AbsTotEM1 
Post -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (-0.8560) (-0.8620) (-0.0356) (-0.0704) 
Adopter 0.0013 0.0013 0.0053 0.0057* 
 (0.3890) (0.4063) (1.5686) (1.6780) 
Post x Adopter -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0067* -0.0066* 
 (-0.9010) (-0.8963) (-1.8559) (-1.8377) 
DA_MJ  0.0136  0.0820* 
  (0.4896)  (1.7291) 
Constant 0.0303* 0.0304* 0.0147 0.0153 
 (1.9278) (1.9301) (0.7414) (0.7652) 
     
Controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and qtr. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.3130 0.3131 0.3134 0.3150 
N 27,558 27,558 27,558 27,558 
Panel B. The effect of ITRs on RTM2 and TotalEM2 
Variables AbRTM2 AbsRTM2 AbsTotEM2 AbsTotEM2 
Post 0.0003 0.0003 0.0024 0.0023 
 (0.1223) (0.1170) (0.8917) (0.8718) 
Adopter 0.0012 0.0012 0.0055* 0.0057* 
 (0.3686) (0.3830) (1.7577) (1.8283) 
Post x Adopter -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0087** -0.0087** 
 (-1.1699) (-1.1677) (-2.5188) (-2.5138) 
DA_MJ  0.0106  0.0488 
  (0.5218)  (1.2326) 
Constant 0.0185 0.0186 0.0049 0.0053 
 (1.5058) (1.5123) (0.2961) (0.3154) 
     
Controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and qtr. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.1943 0.1944 0.2176 0.2183 




Panel C. The effect of ITRs on components of real earnings management  
Variables AbsABCash AbsABExp AbsABProd 
Post 0.0015 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.9769) (-0.2491) (-0.4044) 
Adopter 0.0024 -0.0009 0.0029** 
 (1.4928) (-0.2498) (2.1898) 
Post x Adopter -0.0057*** -0.0027 -0.0010 
 (-2.6393) (-0.8936) (-0.6596) 
Constant 0.0201** 0.0286*** 0.0235** 
 (2.1811) (2.6847) (2.0517) 
    
Controls included Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and qtr. FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.1948 0.3344 0.3248 
N 27,558 27,558 27,558 
Panel D. The effect of ITRs on accruals earnings management when controlling for RTM 




Post 0.0010 0.0009 0.0005 
 (0.8848) (0.5336) (0.3059) 
Adopter 0.0042*** 0.0009 0.0056*** 
 (3.1414) (0.3839) (2.8405) 
Post x Adopter -0.0047*** -0.0034* -0.0046** 
 (-3.2220) (-1.8197) (-2.3555) 
RTM1 -0.0105 0.2185*** -0.2210*** 
 (-0.9772) (13.8872) (-13.6862) 
Constant -0.0061 -0.0043 0.0048 
 (-0.6850) (-0.4455) (0.5339) 
    
Controls included Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and qtr. FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.2650 0.3421 0.5266 
N 27,558 14,585 12,973 
Table 7 presents the results from estimating equation (3) using as dependent variables proxies for real earnings 
management. Panel A (B) shows the effect of ITRs on RTM1 (RTM2) and AbsTotEM1 (AbsTotEM2); columns 
2 and 4 additionally control for discretionary accruals. Panel C shows the effect of ITRs on each of the 
components of real earnings management. Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using equation (9), 
where Expense is defined as the sum of research and development and selling, general and administrative 
expenses. Abnormal cash from operations is estimated using equation (10) where CFO is cash flow from 
operations. Abnormal production costs are estimated using equation (11), where Prod are production costs, 
obtained as the sum of cost and goods sold and change in inventory during the year. Panel D shows the effect 
that adopting ITRs has on AbsDA_MJ when controlling for RTM1 in addition to the vector of controls included 
in main analysis (Table 3). The vector of controls included consists of the following variables: Size, BTM, ROA, 
NOA, InstOwner, InstOwner_d, BdIndep, BdIndep_d, InvEIndex, EIndex_d, NrAnalyst, Analyst_d, ZScore, 
Sigma_CFO, Sigma_REV, BIG4, Lev, and r10b5. Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. T-statistics 
are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
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Table 8. Target beating behavior and timeliness of bad news recognition 
Panel A. Meeting and beating earnings targets 
Variables LowQualBeater LowR&D_Qual Beater LowDA_QualBeater 
Post 0.0743 0.1588** -0.0447 
 (1.0164) (2.0914) (-0.9956) 
Adopter 0.1921** 0.1582* 0.0201 
 (2.2868) (1.8267) (0.4097) 
Post x Adopter -0.1337† -0.2950*** 0.0445 
 (-1.4833) (-3.1683) (0.8032) 
Constant -0.2155 0.2661 -0.2927 
 (-0.4042) (0.4821) (-0.5263) 
    
Controls included Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and qtr. FE Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0907 0.1384 0.0552 
N 5,564 5,776 14,045 
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Panel B. Timeliness of loss recognition 
  Variables ACC  z-stat  
 Post x Adopter x CF x DCF 0.0007**  (2.2429)  
 dREV 0.0016***  (6.7877)  
 GPPE 0.0000  (0.3377)  
 DCF 0.0003***  (2.7887)  
 CF 0.0002  (1.6366)  
 CF x DCF 0.0003  (1.2368)  
 Post 0.0000  (0.2074)  
 Post x DCF -0.0001  (-0.4395)  
 CF x Post -0.0000  (-0.4253)  
 CF x Post x DCF -0.0000  (-0.0213)  
 Adopter -0.0001***  (-3.0061)  
 Adopter x Post 0.0002  (1.0378)  
 CF x Adopter 0.0002  (1.1538)  
 CF x Adopter x DCF -0.0009***  (-2.6972)  
 Post x Adopter 0.0001**  (2.3498)  
 Post x Adopter x DCF -0.0002  (-1.0250)  
 CF x Post x Adopter -0.0001  (-0.7246)  
 Constant -0.0002***  (-7.2530)  
 R-squared 0.0325    
  N 30,292    
Table 8, panel A presents the results from estimating equation (6) using as dependent variables LowQualBeater, 
LowR&D_QualBeater and LowDA_QualBeater, respectively. The vector of controls included in panel A consists 
of the following variables: Size, BTM, ROA, NOA, InstOwner, InstOwner_d, BdIndep, BdIndep_d, InvEIndex, 
EIndex_d, NrAnalyst, Analyst_d, ZScore, Sigma_CFO, Sigma_REV, r10b5, BIG4, and Lev. Industry and quarter 
fixed effects are included. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Panel B 
presents the results of the timeliness of loss recognition analysis in equation (7). The dependent variable is ACC. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
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Table 9. Earnings restatements 
Variables Coefficient P>z 
Adopter 0.0465 (0.4393) 
Post 0.2154** (2.2787) 
Post x Adopter -0.3409*** (-2.7701) 
InstOwner -0.3845** (-2.4028) 
InstOwner_d -0.0372 (-0.3472) 
BdIndep -0.6041** (-2.0593) 
BdIndep_d -0.5393** (-2.4858) 
InvEIndex 0.1860*** (2.6522) 
EIndex_d -0.4441** (-2.1888) 
Growth -0.0040 (-0.0552) 
Lev 0.6876*** (4.5405) 
Constant -4.0818*** (-5.7208) 
   
Industry and year FE Yes  
Pseudo R-squared 0.3069  
N 9,140  
Table 9 shows the results of a logit regression where the dependent variable, Restate, is 1 if the firm has had 
any restatement. Industry and year fixed effects are included. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are 




Table 10. Alternative Measure of ITRs 
Panel A: Propensity score matching 
  Coefficient P>z 
Size -0.12794 0 
BTM 0.022003 0.382 
NrAnalyst 0.126663 0 
InstOwner -0.03939 0.487 
   
Pseudo R-squared 0.0204  
N 169,389  
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the ITR adopters and control firms after the propensity score 
match in the event year 
 Adopters Control Firms p-value 
Size 5.627202 5.657199 0.8634 
BTM 0.6646 0.578058 0.2695 
InstOwner 0.416665 0.406294 0.7554 
NrAnalyst 1.729423 1.654257 0.3262 
N 171 171  
    






Post -0.0004 0.0018 -0.0019 
 (-0.21) (0.71) (-0.83) 
Adopter 0.0022 0.0003 0.0065* 
 (0.83) (0.09) (1.93) 
Post x Adopter -0.0079** -0.0098** -0.0049 
 (-2.47) (-2.42) (-1.22) 
    
Controls included Yes Yes Yes 
Ind & Qtr. FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.3048 0.3116 0.4972 
N 6,305 3,340 2,965 
This table presents the analysis on the more restricted sample derived from the alternative measure of ITR adoption. 
For this analysis, we have only retained observations that have non-missing data for NrAnalyst and InstOwner. Panel 
A shows the results of the probit model used to obtain the propensity score matched sample of 171 pairs of ITR 
adopters and control firms. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of these firms in the event quarter. Panel C 
presents the results of estimating equation 3 on this sample. Post x Adopter takes 1 (0) in the period after (before) 
adoption, and is set to missing in the adoption quarter. Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at firm-level. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of Insider Trading Restriction Windows 
 
 
EA indicates Earnings Announcement date for each quarter. Allowed is the window when insider trading is allowed, 
and it is typically the first third (approximately one calendar month or 20 trading days) of the period between two 
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Panel A. Average AbsDA_MJ for the PSM sample of firms that adopt insider trading restrictions. The left side of the 
figure shows the values for average annual AbsDA_MJ recorded by adopters before the adoption year (years -10 to 




Panel B. Average AbsDA_MJ for adopters in the PSM sample before and after ITR adoption, by quartiles of insider 
trading volume in dollar-amount. 
